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THE RIGHTS OF A RIPARIAN OWNER IN LAND LOST BY
EROSION
In a recent case" decided by the Court of Errors and Appeals
of New Jersey it was held, that if land was formerly fast land
and the title was lost by erosion, it became the property of the
state, not merely as long as it remained under water, but, if the
state made a riparian grant, absolutely.
When is title lost by erosion? Can the state deprive a riparian
owner of his right to accretion without compensation, or is such
right a vested right which can be taken away only by proper
proceedings and upon due compensation?
The rules applying to accretion and erosion are inseparably
bound together, the gains of one compensating for the losses of
the other. By the common law of England, two distinct cases
were recognized. First, when the land was gained by gradual
'Dewey Land Co., et al. v. Stevens et al., go Atl. (N. J.) 1O4O; 9I At!.
(N. J.) 934.
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accretion or dereliction, land so made belonged to the owner of
the adjoining upland. Second, when the land was gained by
sudden avulsion or reliction, the land thus formed belonged to
the king.2 Conversely, and by way of compensation, when the
sea gradually encroached on the land, the Crown took the benefit,
while if such encroachment were sudden and violent, the sub-ject did not lose his property, if he could still identify his
property when it reappeared. 3
The American cases are rather unsatisfactory. The opinions
are loose and inaccurate, and contain numerous incorrect dicta.
The advice of Lord Ellenborough4 is particularly applicable. He
said, "The rule stated in each case, like every other proposition
laid down by a judge, ought to be understood with particular
reference to the facts of the case then before the court."
Perhaps the most widely quoted rule is that although land be
submerged by the sea, yet if it eventually reappear and remain
capable of identification, the title thereto revests in the original
owner. Where the rule has been thus stated, the land had been
suddenly washed away, and in so far as limited to such facts the
cases are correct. But when the sea, lake or navigable stream
gradually and imperceptibly encroaches upon the land, the loss
falls upon the owner, and the land thus lost returns to the owner-
ship of the state.6 The title to such land is lost and cannot
revest in the original owner if the land subsequently reappear.
Whatever rights the original owner may acquire in the reformed
land arise from his right of accretion and not from the former
title.
When the land has returned to the ownership of the state, is
that ownership absolute, or is it subject to certain rights of the
adjacent riparian owner? Clearly, this ownership is subject to
the right of the riparian owner to acquire title to the land, if it
reappear as an accretion to his fast land. This right to alluvion
is a vested right. It is an inherent and essential attribute to the
'Hargrave's Law Tracts, p. 30; 2 B1. CoM. 262; AngeJI, Tide-waters,
pp. 264, 265.
' In re The Hull and Selby R. R., 5 M. & W. 327; IHale, De Jure Mari$,
chap. 4; Moore's History of the Foreshore, p. 381.4Hunter v. Prinsep, io East. 392.
'Widdecombe v. Chiles et al., 173 Mo. 195; Stockley v. Cissna, uig
Fed. 812; Mulry v. Norton et al., ioo N. Y. 424; VanDevanter v. Lott,
172 Fed. 574; Murphy v. Norton et al., 61 How. Pr. 197.
'Matter of City of Buffalo, 206 N. Y. 319
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original property, which cannot be taken away, even by the state
for public use, without compensation.7
The decision in the principal case is undoubtedly correct,
though the language used by the judge in his opinion is not
strictly accurate. The custom of judges to digress from the
facts of a case, and to lay down rules of law not necessary for
the decision of the case in point, is a most pernicious one. It
makes the reports of our cases unnecessarily long, and has given
rise to many of the misconceptions of what the law actually is.
VALIDITY OF A GIFT MORTIS CAUSA MADE IN CONTEMPLATION
OF SUICIDE.
A depositor in a bank drew a check and sent it to his betrothed
in contemplation of suicide. Held, the transaction, if a gift
mortis causa, is invalid under N. Y. Consol. Laws c. 40 sec. 2301
declaring that suicide is a grave public wrong.-
The effect of this decision is to punish one, the innocent donee,
for the wrong of another. The case relied on for authority, and
which it is believed is the only one in point, seems to be wrong.
The reason given is that such a gift is contrary to public policy,
but no such policy is evident. There are three reasons for the
punishment of a wrong: reformation of the wrong-doer, retri-
bution, and prevention of recurrences of the wrong.
2 This hold-
ing is supported by none of these reasons. It can neither reform
nor wreak vengeance on the wrong-doer for he no longer exists.
The very statute on which the decision rests does not make
suicide a crime, the legislature realizing the "impossibility of
reaching the successful perpetrator." It can not appreciably
prevent other suicides, for either this rule would be unknown or,
if known, the intending suicide would either make an absolute
gift or would not care. A man may commit suicide for one or
both of two reasons, because he hopes thereby to benefit some
one for whom he has greater affection than for his own life or
because the burden of living is greater than the instinctive dread
'County of St. Clair v. Lovington, 23 Wall. 46; Freeland v. Pennsyl-
vania R. R. Co., 197 Pa. 529; Knudsen v.,Omanson, io Utah 124; Munic-
ipality No. 2 v. Orleans Cotton Press, iS La. 122; Farnham, Waters and
Water Rights, p. 324.1Baiibridge v. Hoes, 149 N. Y. Supp. 2o.
'Hohnes, The Common Law, p. 42.
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of death. If the first reason exists, the intending suicide would
as soon make an absolute gift. If there is simply the second
reason, the gift is only a collateral incident. In such case it is
conceivable that he, wishing to make the gift, would prefer to
make a gift causa mortis rather than an absolute one, for intend-
ing suicides may doubt that it is a physical possibility to destroy
themselves, in which case they might wish the gift to be revocable.
To the extent of this preference, one minor element in his desire
to commit suicide is made less strong. But this preference for
a gift causa mortis is not calculated to exert a preventive
influence directly on the wish to end one's life where the second
reason exists. It neither makes the intending suicide less
miserable nor puts him more in fear of death but affects merely
the collateral incident. Only in this partial effect on a minor
element of the intent to destroy one's own life in one class of
suicides does this rule have a preventive effect. If there be any
policy in such a ruling, that of protection to innocent sufferers
from such acts is more evident. That the public welfare is
more important than protection to the individual does not mean
that a decision is right which works the slightest public benefit
and the greatest individual injustice, for the public is only a
number of individuals. The principal case is distinguishable
from the one relied on because, in the latter jurisdiction, suicide
is made a crime.8 A few cases hold that there can be a recovery
on an insurance contract where the insured purposely takes his
life while sane.4 The cases holding the opposite view represent
the more prevalent rule, but even these are distinguishable
because in such cases the property would be taken away-from
another innocent third party, because an absolute gift of it could
not be made at the time and because there is an implied promise
in the contract that the insured will not do anything wrongful
to hasten the maturity of the policy.5 On the ground of policy
it is submitted that the holding in the principal case is erroneous.
'Agnew v. Belfast Banking Co., Ir. Q. B. 1896, 204.4Seiler v. Economic Life Ass'n., 105 Iowa, 87.
Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362.
